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It is commonplace, if erroneous, to suppose that worldviews (or ontological conceptions) that 
underpin, or are presupposed by, substantive analyses and/or methodological stances are 
somehow beyond interrogation2. This is thought to be especially so regarding social 
ontological orientations (see discussion in Lawson 2014). To the contrary ontological 
conceptions, including those relating to the social realm, are easily shown to be subject to 
empirical assessment in both absolute terms (see e.g. Lawson 2003 chapter 2; Lawson 2014) 
and in comparison to the explanatory power of competing accounts (see e.g., Lawson 2014, 
2015a). 
 
In advancing a specific theory of social ontology over the years I have often drawn support 
for the conception defended by contrasting it with the (largely implicit) ontology of closed 
systems of isolated atoms presupposed by very many social theorists -- and most especially 
by contemporary economists, not least in their heavy reliance on methods of mathematical 
modelling (see Lawson 2015a).  However, it can with reason be said that in making this 
comparison I have been choosing a relatively soft target. This is doubtless true. But my 
purpose in making this comparison was not so much to garner additional explanatory support 
for the ontological conception I defend as to employ the clear explanatory superiority of the 
latter to cast doubt on the wisdom of the prevailing widespread uncritical reliance on methods 
of mathematical modelling in social theory (an emphasis that in modern mainstream 
economics yet continues unabated).      
 
In the current paper, though, I do want to compare the conception I defend with a more 
serious target or alternative. It seems to me that the conception of social ontology that is most 
widely known and influential, at least outside of modern economics, is that associated with 
John Searle. As far as I know the conception advanced by Searle and that which I have long 
defended have hitherto not be systematically contrasted. Here I embark on an initial attempt 
to make a comparative evaluation. It is true that the two conceptions are frequently noted 
together in passing (sometimes being speculated as being similar at other times as opposed)3.  
                                                          
1 Forthcoming in the Journal for the Theory of Social Behaviour. I am indebted to the Independent Social Research 
Foundation for funding the research on which this paper draws.  
2 Very often the phrase ‘that’s merely metaphysical’ (where metaphysics and ontology and interpreted widely as 
interchangeable) is voiced in a manner that can only be interpreted to mean that the claim being referenced is mere 
speculation and not open to empirical assessment. This of course is an orientation encouraged by the logical positivists.  As 
Rudolf Carnap, a leading contributor expressed matter: "Metaphysicians are musicians without musical ability" (Carnap, The 
Elimination of Metaphysics, in Sarkar, Sahotra (ed.), Logical Empiricism at its Peak, p. 30).  
3 Of course neither conception has been developed without the input of others, and I am particularly grateful to others 
involved on social ontology in Cambridge. Both Searle and I are involved with social ontology groups in our own 
universities, i.e., with the Cambridge Social Ontology Group (CSOG) and the Berkeley Social Ontology Group BSOG 
respectively. Both groups might be said to be developing joint projects in social ontology. For contributions to the former see 
for example Lawson, 1994,1997, 2003, John Latsis et al., 2007; Stephen Pratten, 2014. For contributions to the Berkeley 
project see especially Searle, 1995, 2010. Of course, it would be a mistake to suppose that either of the two groups are 
internally fully homogenous. However, I believe that in terms of broad philosophical perspective each group is relatively 
homogeneous compared to the contrasts across the two groups, and here in effect I shall be focusing on the latter differences 
by considering the conceptions of myself and Searle. 
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But to my knowledge they have not hitherto been systematically contrasted and evaluated 
relative to each other4. 
 
My finding is that in terms of formal commitments the two conceptions defended appear 
strongly opposed. For whilst I am committed to the reality of emergent social entities Searle 
is reluctant to go any further than acknowledging a reality of institutional facts. That is, while 
I am committed to the reality of ‘social objects’, Searle allows only that we can talk of 
different facts about any given (non-social) object (this is a piece of paper, we count this 
object as money), and that is all we need to form a coherent social ontology.      
 
It will be seen that underpinning this contrast are differences in fundamentals. Whilst Searle 
puts his primary emphasis on language as a foundational feature of social reality, I 
additionally emphasise the organising role of emergent collective practices in sustaining 
(equally emergent) social totalities. It is this contrast that I seek primarily to examine here. 
 
So the two conceptions are prima facie very different. However, I will be suggesting that 
these differences are not as incompatible as they at first appear.  I will certainly be arguing 
for the explanatory superiority of the account I have previously defended.  But where 
systematic contrasts in the two conceptions are identified I will be suggesting that not only do 
they not render the two projects are irreconcilable, but that the position I defend is seemingly 
frequently implicit in Searle’s own reasoning, especially when he seeks to resolve issues that 
are found to be problematic for his conception.   
 
Preliminaries: apparent similarities  
 
Although I am here concerned with identifying and evaluating contrasting assessments, let 
me start by briefly sketching some fundamental (apparent) similarities. 
 
Most obviously the projects have the same broad objective, if slightly different domains of 
primary focus.  
 
In my own research, the focus is the social realm understood as the set of all phenomena 
whose existence depends necessarily5 on human beings and their interactions. The goal is to 
defend and explain the possibility of investigating social phenomena through providing 
(fallible) explanatory insights and assessments whose truth or falsity depend not on opinions 
of specific observers but on the way the world is (Lawson, 1997, 2012). 
 
Searle gives primary focus to a slightly narrower set of phenomena, concentrating on those 
said to be “ontologically subjective in the sense that they exist only as experienced by human 
and animal subjects” (Searle, 2010, p. 18). But the goal is similar. Thus Searle specifically 
distinguishes ‘epistemically objective statements’ as those of which the “truth and falsity can 
be ascertained independently of the attitudes and opinions of observers”, and questions “How 
can there be an epistemically objective set of statements about a reality which is 
ontologically subjective? (Searle, 2010, p. 18; emphasis in the original). 
                                                          
4 Because this contrast is my focus I will necessarily have to leave aside the huge literature that has been concerned with 
critiquing either my own conception or that of Searle, as well as Searle’s replies excepting where the latter bears on relevant 
issues of comparison of our two positions and represent the most developed account of Searle’s thinking certain topics of 
contention that I can find.    
5 The qualifier ‘necessarily’ is attached to exclude those phenomena that depend contingently on us. To the extent we have 
the power to destroy species, and perhaps eventually to blow up (part of) the moon, then such phenomena depend for their 
existence on our not doing so. The qualifier ‘necessarily’ prevents such phenomena being thereby classified as social.      
3 
 
 
Both accounts are self-consciously naturalistic in the sense of seeking to remain consistent 
with the most explanatorily successful accounts of non-social natural science.  For Searle this 
is achieved more or less by design.  But it has been an objective of my own account as well 
(see especially Lawson, 2012).  
 
Perhaps the most striking apparent feature of similarity in the resulting accounts of the nature 
of society is one that I have throughout referred to as social positioning (Lawson, 1994, 1997, 
2012, 2015a, 2015b, 2015c) and which Searle refers to as assigning of statuses (or of status 
functions) (Searle, 1995, 2010). 
 
On my account an individual becomes (acquires the identity of) a university professor, prime 
minister, or taxi driver, etc., on being collectively accepted/recognised as having gained 
(legitimate) occupancy of the position Professor, Prime Minister, Taxi Driver, etc6. 
Associated with each such position is a set of collective practices, rights and obligations. 
Similarly an artefact becomes (acquires the identity of) a table, cash, passport, and so on, on 
being collectively accepted/recognised as positioned as such.  In this case certain causal 
features of the positioned objects in question become interpreted as their functions (see e.g. 
Lawson, 1994, 1997, 2003, 2012).  
 
Seemingly in parallel Searle writes: 
 
“The distinctive feature of human social reality […] is that humans have the capacity to 
impose functions on objects and people where the objects and the people cannot perform 
the functions solely in virtue of their physical structure. The performance of the function 
requires that there be a collectively recognized status that the person or object has, and it is 
only in virtue of that status that the person or object can perform the function in question. 
Examples are pretty much everywhere: a piece of private property, the President of the 
United States, a twenty dollar bill, and a professor in a university are all people or objects 
that are able to perform certain functions in virtue of the fact that they have a collectively 
recognized status which enables them to perform those functions in a way they could not 
do without the collective recognition of the status” (2010, p. 7) 
 
Proponents of both conceptions stress that collective acceptance or recognition does not 
imply necessary approval of the content of that which is recognised. Rather these terms are 
employed to indicate the existence of a shared belief that such and such a situation is so, and 
a willingness of each (‘accepting’) individual (for the time being) thereby to go along with 
that situation (see e.g., Lawson, 1997, 2012, p. 360; Searle 2010, p. 8). 
 
A slight difference between the two conceptions is that I argue that the glue of society that 
holds it all together are the human capacities of being trustworthy and of trusting. These are 
essential if obligations are to be met, and individuals are prepared to act on the expectation of 
their being met.  Searle instead suggests that the glue takes the form of the statuses (or status 
functions): 
 
“It is because status functions carry deontic powers that they provide the glue that holds 
human civilization together. And how do they do that? Deontic powers have a unique trait 
                                                          
6 I shall throughout follow the convention of capitalising the first letter of any positions but not any occupants.  Thus a 
lecturer occupies the position Lecturer. 
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[…]: once recognized, they provide us with reasons for acting that are independent of our 
inclinations and desires.” (2010, p. 9) 
   
This suggested difference does appear rather minimal, but may be found to reflect 
distinctions that are perhaps ultimately rather important. In any case, it is to the latter 
seemingly more significant differences that I now explicitly turn.  
 
I start by outlining notions that, if accepted by Searle, figure at best only implicitly in his 
analysis, whereas for my own purposes, they are rendered explicit and systematic, because I 
regard them as fundamental. I am thinking in particular of social emergence, and in particular 
the community as an emergent relationally-organised, and so structured, entity or totality, 
where I take the community to be the locus of most of the features that the two conceptions 
hold in common.  In maintaining this conception I am, as already noted, thus committing 
myself to the reality of social entities and structures, whereas Searle, again as already noted, 
prefers to talk of, and is seemingly reluctant to commit himself on the existence of anything 
beyond, social or rather ‘institutional’ facts.  
 
Let me elaborate, starting by outlining my own conception of social entities and specifically 
emergent communities, before turning to give an overview of Searle’s account of collective 
intentionality, status functions, status function declarations and  institutional facts.    
 
A Social Entity Conception: Emergence, Community and Collective Practice 
 
By emergence I mean the appearance of novelty or something previously absent or 
unprecedented, somehow fashioned out of, if remaining dependent upon, matters already in 
existence. Emergent phenomena, or at least those that interest me here, are bound up with 
novel (emergent) totalities or systems, and specifically those that express (or can be 
interpreted as expressing) a form of coherence at the system level. Any such emergent 
totality, I have elsewhere argued, typically comes into being via a process whereby pre-
existing elements become (perhaps with some modification) relationally organised to 
constitute thereby components of a novel system. Such a process always occurs in a context, 
so that some of these components become also related to features of the local environment. 
 
Any system or totality that so emerges is, qua an organised system, irreducible to the sum 
total of the elements that come to serve as components just because it is constituted in part by 
the manner in which the components are arranged or relationally organised; the relational 
organisation too is an emergent. As a result, ontological reduction of the emergent totality to 
the pre-existing elements alone, considered apart from their being relationally organised, is 
proscribed. For the same reason any emergent powers of efficient causation of an emergent 
totality are irreducible to, in the sense of being not predictable from knowledge of, the causal 
powers of the original elements considered apart from their eventual manner of organisation 
as components of the totality. So, causal reduction of a simple sort is also proscribed7 (see 
Lawson, 2013a).  
 
Consider, as an illustration, the construction of a building to serve, say, as a house. The 
components include bricks, mortar, wood, panes of glass, cement, etc.  Of course there will 
                                                          
7 There are more sophisticated forms of the thesis of casual reduction that hold that emergent causal powers are, if not 
straightforwardly reducible to, nevertheless explicable solely in terms of the causal powers of the components.  However, I 
show elsewhere that this is generally not the case, and seemingly not at all so with respect to social causation (see Lawson, 
2013a). 
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be a context, a plot of land, and this will be prepared so that the various components can 
relate to it in an appropriate manner.  At any stage in the process of construction an observer 
will find not only the part of the building constructed so far, formed out of various elements 
serving now as components, but also the relational organisation of the latter components (to 
each other, and to elements in their environment).  And this organisation will be essential to 
the house’s construction and properties.  As the house is completed, so is the relational 
organisation of the house’s components; the two – the totality and the organisational structure 
-- emerge simultaneously.  Each are causal, but in different ways.  The house has the powers 
to provide safety and shelter, to facilitate family or other indoor activities, to be bought and 
sold, and so on. The arrangement of the parts makes the house feasible. The latter is a form of 
formal causation.  
 
To appreciate the role of arrangement or organisation in contributing to the emergent powers 
of the totality, imagine the house being taken apart and the various elements that comprised 
its components now being bound together in a blind or random fashion.  It is unlikely the 
outcome will have the (efficient) causal powers of a house. The organisation or arrangement 
of the bricks and other bits and pieces makes a difference. And on this criterion of causality, 
i.e., of possessing the power or ability to make a difference, the relational organisation is 
causal. Clearly, then, if ultimately somewhat trivially, the causal powers of the emergent 
totality are not predictable from those of the elements used to form its components if the 
latter are considered apart from the manner in which they are to be arranged.  
 
The social domain 
 
The example of the house already draws us into a consideration of the social domain (as I 
delimit the latter).  The house is a form of artefact, a form of emergent social totality that is 
necessarily dependent on human interaction for its coming into being (and being maintained). 
I argue that there are essentially two general forms of emergent social entity. The more 
fundamental sort are, or can be termed, communities, these being forms of organised systems 
that include human beings amongst the components. The second kind are artefacts. These do 
not have humans as components; rather they mostly (especially in the case of ‘high 
technology’) are constituted through the relational organisation of other artefacts. An 
additional specific emergent system is language8 (on all this see Lawson, 2012, 2013a, 
2013b).  
 
According to the conception I defend, but possibly not according to Searle’s, central features 
such as (those that I designate) positions (statuses) and associated rights, obligations and 
collective practices are relativized to, and indeed are in fact properties of, particular 
communities. By collective practices I understand those ways of proceeding (in order to 
achieve specific sorts of outcomes) that the community accepts as the done (as the 
collectively accepted) ways (at least for those appropriately positioned). It is positions, and 
associated positional rights, obligations and collective practices that form the structure of 
human systems or communities, that relationally organise the human components.  
 
Here it is important to recognise that not only are there both rights and obligations associated 
with any given position (and so accessed by any occupant of the position) but also each of 
these rights (obligations) is matched by obligations (rights) associated with some other 
(thereby internally related) positions. 
                                                          
8 Whilst entities such as corporations can be positioned as both artefacts and as communities - see below and Lawson 2015b, 
2015c) 
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Thus an individual appointed to the position University Lecturer within the UK community, 
and so acquiring the (positional) identity of university lecturer, is allowed to follow various 
practices, where being so permitted are amongst the rights of occupying the position.  The 
content of these rights may include the use of university libraries and other research 
resources, of being paid by the state, etc.  The individual is also not only allowed, but also 
required, to follow various practices; these are the obligations of being so positioned, and 
their content may include giving lectures, and setting and marking exams, etc. But any 
positional rights accessed by the individual are always matched by obligations of others. If a 
university lecturer has the rights to use an office, borrow from university libraries etc., these 
rights are matched by and to obligations of other positioned individuals or groups to ensure 
there are processes in place serving to fund, facilitate and maintain university offices, 
libraries, lecture halls, and so forth.  Similarly, the obligations of lecturers to give lectures, set 
exams, mark them fairly, etc., are matched by student rights to attend lectures, sit exams, 
expect the exams to be marked, and fairly; and so on. 
 
Social relations and power 
  
If human individuals are organised through being positioned as components of a system, and 
if the various positions are interrelated by way of connecting rights and obligations, it is 
these connections that most qualify as the content of the category social relation. In other 
words, a social relation just is (or is first and foremost) an accepted set of (matching) rights 
and obligations holding between, and connecting, two or more positions or occupants of 
positions. Social interaction can be understood as the contingent actualisations of such social 
relations. 
 
Moreover, because any positioned rights are matched by, and as noted are internally related 
to, one or more obligations of others positioned elsewhere, rights and obligations can be said 
to be (positive and negative) (positional) powers. There are two aspects at least to this latter 
assessment.  First a right is a power in the sense that it is something the bearer has the ability 
to do but need not; a power can always exist unexercised.  Thus, being positioned as a 
university academic at Cambridge University I have the power to work in a university office, 
to borrow a book from my faculty library, etc.  But in all such cases I may choose never to 
do so. Second, where these powers exist they are always over others and their practices. 
Thus, certain others have the obligation to sign me out a book from my Faculty library if I 
request it, whether they wish to or not.  Yet others have obligations to ensure my office, and 
indeed the library, is usable, including maintaining the IT facilities in each. Thus, if on a 
given day I find my computer does not work, or, say, that my office window has somehow 
shattered leaving glass all over my office floor, I may elect to sort everything myself as best 
I can, but I retain the power to get some other appropriately positioned party to sort it all for 
me, whether they really want to or not. So rights and obligations are indeed positive and 
negative powers, and so all social relations are power relations. 
 
Social entities 
 
A final feature I want briefly to (re)emphasise is that all these noted emergent phenomena, if 
mind dependent, are real; in particular the social systems that I am calling communities are 
real entities.  Of course they depend on human beliefs and interactions and are continually 
being reproduced and transformed through practice; and so are in process.  But then so 
seemingly is most of the rest of reality also processual in nature (see Lawson, 2012). 
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Rights and obligations I take to be equally real.  To recall, these are powers which, in content, 
are essentially allowed and required ways of doing things for occupants of specific positions, 
constituted in relation to other allowed and required ways of doing things. They rest on a 
shared belief that every member, or at least a relevant subset, of the community has implicitly 
‘agreed’ or ‘accepted’ to bide by, or go along with, them where such ‘agreement’ or 
‘acceptance’ can arise or emerge in any of a number of ways (described below). Where 
members of the community (fallibly) believe certain collective agreements are in place they 
act on these beliefs and conform to the practices implicated. 
 
Very often rights and obligations emerge via a process of negotiation whereby formal 
agreement is reached and the content of the latter (regarding allowed and required ways of 
doing things for those appropriately positioned) is recorded in some manner, in signed 
documents, such as contracts and deeds of ownership, etc. 
 
On other occasions any ‘agreement’ can be indirect or anyway ensuing, with declarations of 
positioning rights and obligations being assigned by someone or body (collectively) 
held/agreed to (be positioned appropriately as to) have the right or authority so to declare 
them.  If, say, a government that is (collectively) regarded as legitimate declares a new bank 
holiday, and this directive is widely regarded as being within government’s legitimate remit, 
there may well emerge within the community at large an acceptance that, on a relevant day, 
working people have a right to do something other than go to work. Such declarations, 
though, are only really constitutive if (eventually) they are validated by (through the 
conformity of the collective practices of) those implicated in the declaration.    
 
Frequently, such declarative powers may rest merely on the grounds of one or more 
individuals being appropriately positioned regarding access to appropriate resources or 
connections, etc. Thus we might imagine the formation, say, of a symphony orchestra. Here 
one or more individuals may obtain a sponsorship, declare the existence of a specific 
symphony orchestra, decide the latter’s positions and associated rights and obligations, 
advertise the positions, and seek to appoint appropriately trained individuals to the positions.  
The orchestra is an emergent but planned community. Individuals may join via a process of 
selection and by agreeing to the conditions set in terms of rights and obligations. And the 
initial declaration is validated (its conditions of satisfaction met) only if, first the call is 
deemed legitimate in the wider community, second appropriately qualified individuals sign 
up, and third the orchestra is eventually accepted as a functioning entity within the 
community.  
 
Any performance too will be planned. When playing a particular composition each musician 
positioned as a component of the orchestra will have an obligation to contribute at a relevant 
moment as indicated by a score and perhaps a conductor, as well as an obligation to remain 
silent and attentive when others are playing, just as he or she has the right to expect the same 
of others, where the others have matching obligations to act similarly in their turn, and so on.  
Here the sets of positioned rights and obligation of the orchestra, provide the structure via 
which the various situated musicians interact to produce the output that is a symphony. 
 
However, many of the more interesting sets of rights and obligations, or forms of behaviour 
that are taken to represent the content of community agreement or acceptance, do emerge in a 
somewhat more spontaneous manner and are manifest in the structuring of community 
collective practices, practices that are thereafter taken as constituting the accepted ways of 
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doing things in the respective community. Collective practices effectively carry and manifest 
shared beliefs about implicit collective agreements about what can and should be done in a 
relevant context to achieve some specific (sorts of) goal(s). 
 
Frequently, a pattern of behaviour emerges unwittingly for, say, allocating something 
relatively scarce, such as queuing in a particular manner or direction to obtain food at a rock 
concert, or to pay in a local store; and from there on in all members of the community 
conform in the belief that the existing pattern is that which is accepted within the community. 
They suppose that their right to participate is tied to an obligation to do so in the observed 
way. 
 
Certain driving practices too are a familiar example of a more spontaneous emergence of sets 
of rights and obligations. Early morning commuters in the UK (certainly around Cambridge) 
quickly discover that different practices are followed than are in evidence later in the day. 
Those entering main roads from side roads are allowed onto the main roads at regular 
intervals.  Very often the emergent pattern is that one car enters from the side road, then one 
car on the main road passes by the entrance of the side road, then another from the side road 
enters, then another from the main road passes, etc.  Sometimes the emergent pattern is two 
or three from the main road pass then one from the side road enters, then two or three pass on 
the main road etc. Where patterns such as these and others emerge, any individual that does 
not conform is routinely tut-tutted, receiving of finger waving, have horns sounded at them 
and so on9.  
 
The point, of course, is that if such patterns and associated practices did not emerge, then, 
with so much traffic around early in the morning, cars on the side roads would be jammed 
locked for hours. As it happens co-ordinating practices such as I describe emerge without 
anyone explicit direction or declaration, and for the most part are not only not covered by 
formal procedures of the “highway Code” but are contrary to them10. Nevertheless if any 
motorist wishes to be an early morning commuter in the UK, certainly near Cambridge where 
I live, then in order to participate competently, the individual commits to the conditions of 
satisfaction of participating appropriately in the motoring collective practices of the sort 
found on this road. And typically, each community member does seemingly seek to conform 
to any spontaneous form of collective practice believed to be in place.  Deontology, in the 
                                                          
9  On a main road that leads from the outskirts of Cambridge in the south-west into the centre of the city there is a (final) 
roundabout. The first half mile of the section of this main road leading into the centre that comes after the roundabout takes 
the form of a dual carriage way; the road then narrows as a single lane.  In the past, when driving into the centre of 
Cambridge on this road, I have regularly used the dual carriageway part of this road to overtake slower vehicles. On moving 
out to live in the village located in the south west, I have starting entering on this road in the morning rush hour.  The first 
time I did so I started overtaking on the dual carriage way part of the road, as was my custom.  But I noticed eventually that 
all the other cars kept to a slow crawl on the inner part of this dual carriage way, in a moving queue that stretched back to the 
roundabout and beyond; no one else, in other words, used the outer lane to overtake. When I got to the end of the dual 
carriage section of the road I was politely allowed into the main single lane stream. The second morning, I arrived at the dual 
carriage way I took the outside lane again and overtook all the other cars.  But this time I looked at the faces of the drivers 
crawling along single file in the inner lane.  All were looking at me and shaking their heads, raising eyebrows and generally 
sending me negative vibes. Although I was breaking no formal code, it was clear enough that I was here going against a 
spontaneously emergent collective practice. I received a clear message that driving slowly on the inside lane was indeed the 
done way of proceeding at this time of day, and that, as a community member, I was considered to be under an obligation to 
conform (and I have not taken the outside lane of the dual carriage way part of that road in the morning rush hour since). 
10 Of course, I am having to represent, almost codify, the patterns to communicate them in writing.  But they emerge without 
codification, or any necessary symbolic representation. Nor is any pattern quite as precise as I have just represented it. But 
there are identifiable accepted collective practices in place all the same, and all the practices of individual members of the 
community become tokens of typically spontaneous community collective practices, which clearly embody or manifest in 
their structure various sets of rights and obligations. 
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form of commitment etc., is internal to certain collective driving practices with each 
individual act of conforming constituting a form of participation in the particular community. 
 
I am suggesting, then, that forms of collective practice frequently emerge within communities 
or as (sub) communities emerge, as aspects of social structure. In accepting (and being 
accepted) to be positioned as a member of the community, each individual makes a (usually 
merely implicit) commitment to conform to the accepted collective practices of the 
community. This cooperation is an essential feature of the coordination of the interactions of 
community members. As a consequence each community member is not only obliged to 
conform, but has a right to expect that all others will do so. 
 
So social power relations can be highly informal and are seemingly all pervasive. I am 
suggesting that a deontology can spontaneously occur even where a queue forms or a 
particular local and informal collective driving practices emerge. Indeed, there are 
deontologies being drawn upon even as individuals walk down a public street in almost any 
community, certainly in the UK (see Lawson, 2013b).  Wherever there emerges a 
communitywide collective practice, every member of the relevant community has a right to 
participate, but an obligation to do so in the manner perceived as the done way. 
 
Thus, participants in any ongoing queue, say, who observe a set of new arrivals bypassing 
the queue and walking to the front of it, usually understand themselves to have the right to 
protest, and regularly do so. Similarly motorists observing specific individuals (possibly 
unwittingly) breaking informal local motoring collective practices in the UK send the sorts 
of vibes and signals of disapproval that usually quickly lead to the individuals recognising 
the relevant collective practices and conforming.       
 
It is beliefs (about the collective acceptance by others) that condition actual (individual) 
practice. But there is typically a presumption that positionings and/or the determination of 
positional deontologies have been legitimately achieved (according to already established 
accepted ways of doing things). 
 
Where collective practices have emerged spontaneously their legitimacy can typically be 
taken for granted just because the participants are also the instigators of the practices, 
wittingly or otherwise; there is no sense of having them imposed from the outside (by 
authority) in ways that may be illegitimate or ‘fake’. In the case of formal agreements and 
declarations this may not be the case. Thus counterfeit money, forged works of art, mistaken 
decisions in sports games, innocent people erroneously sent to jail, and so on, may all 
function in the manner of genuine articles or correct decisions, etc., if everyone in the 
community, including those with the relevant powers, believe (erroneously) the articles to be 
genuine and/or decisions correct, etc. But if or where evidence of their illegitimacy comes to 
light and is generally accepted, positionings are, where feasible, often changed or even 
annulled. In other words, even, and perhaps especially, where formal agreements including 
declarations are the source of the deontology, their being collectively accepted, itself a 
condition of the validation of the agreements or declarations, will require (a collective belief) 
that it was an appropriate party that, in an appropriate manner, made any such agreements or 
declarations in the first place.      
 
Of course, even the most widespread of collective practices are rarely if ever open to 
everyone in a given community. I do not see children diving cars on the road, and there is a 
presumption that the other drivers, at least in the UK, have passed some kind of driving test, 
10 
 
and have been certified as doing so. In other words, there are implicit acceptances in play not 
only with regards to ways of going on that can and sometimes should be followed but also 
concerning positions and position membership. Collective practices, when restricted in 
accessibility, in effective manifest not just rights and obligations but positions too, an 
indication of the grouping or kind of member that may exercise any such ways of going on. 
Where the appropriate positioning of individuals cannot (as it can be with child drivers) be 
determined by appearance, forms of identification are typically involved (along perhaps with 
contracts that formalise membership of a position along with rights and obligations). 
 
The conception I defend, then, is of a social reality that is mind-dependent but not mind 
determined; there is always a practical dimension. Social reality is in large part at least 
structured by interlocking, internally related, often spontaneously emergent collective 
practices, carrying, in the sense of manifesting, (often contested) rights and obligations inter-
relating the human beings who undertake these practices as positioned components of 
communities, of which the positions and practices in turn are properties.  As such this social 
reality is in a sense both given to individual human beings at the moment each comes to act, 
as a (typically unacknowledged) condition of their individual (positioned) practices, and also 
reproduced and/or transformed as a (typically unintended) result of these individual practices 
taken in total. 
 
Whether the elements of social structure emerge spontaneously or by explicit design including 
declaration, in all cases the structural elements are properties of an emergent community 
through which a coordination of individual practices is achieved by way of its positioned 
members or participants interacting in ways that conform to collective practices, manifesting 
rights and obligations associated with their community positionings. 
 
It should be clear by now too why I take the glue of society to be the human capacities both 
to be trustworthy and to trust, to enter into and to keep to commitments and to accept that 
others are able and willing to do so as well.  For it is the exercising of these capacities that 
ultimately binds rights to matching obligations in practice. This is a bonding that needs to 
hold if specific communities are to facilitate (and to be reproduced by way of facilitating) the 
successful coordination of all the separate individual practices or actions of its participants, 
each with their own particular goals and concerns.  
 
I have run through this because I think Searle interprets, and certainly presents his take on, 
these sorts of issues somewhat differently. Of course, Searle must, and does, have ways of 
dealing with the sorts of issues raised.  But in place of a discussion of social entities, and 
specifically of emergent communities, and of ways and means by which community members, 
perhaps typically though sub-communities, come to position human individuals and objects in 
various ways as components, as well as generate collective practices, Searle focusses on the 
contribution of language, invoking the categories of collective intentionality, status function 
declarations, and institutions as sets of rules grounding institutional facts. Let me briefly 
elaborate. 
 
Searle’s alternative conception 
 
Searle’s primary concern is actually a reality that he labels institutional. This in effect is a 
realm of status functions carrying deontologies created by speech acts taking the form of, or 
being logically similar to, Declarations. Let me explain this statement.    
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A fundamental feature of Searle’s account is his notion of collective intentionality. For Searle 
is it supposed from the outset that any feature of social ontology must be a creation of the 
mind; intentionality is just that property of the mind that creates the reality that Searle seeks to 
understand (2010, p. 25). 
 
Intentionality, more specifically, is a capacity of the mind whereby mental states (caused by 
processes in the brain, and realised in the brain as biological phenomena) are directed at, or 
are about, objects, events, or situations in the world. Intentional states thus include belief, 
desire, hope, fear, etc.  
 
Collective intentionally is the capacity of each individual for first person plural forms of 
intentionality. Here each individual in a group can be separately thinking “We are making X”, 
“We believe such and such is so”, and “We intend to do Z”. Notice that this not the same as 
two or more people in a group either each thinking ‘I intend to play music as part of a 
symphony’, or jointly thinking ‘we intend to play music as part of a symphony’; rather each 
member individually thinks ‘we intend to play music as part of a symphony’. Searle is 
especially interested in collective intentions in planning and in acting. 
 
The notion of collective intentionality has at least two basic components: the intention itself 
(in terms only of the outcomes an individual supposes he or she alone can achieve), and a 
belief about the sorts of related things certain relevant others are doing that can be taken for 
granted: 
 
“In cases of collective intentionality, we have to distinguish what I can individually cause, 
that which can be part of the condition of satisfaction of my intentional content, and that 
which I take for granted as contributed by my collaborators in the collective intentionality. 
If we are playing in a symphony, all that I can actually cause is my individual 
performance.  But I make that performance as my contribution to the total collective 
performance” (Searle, 2010, pp. 44-5).  
 
Notice that the content of the individual’s intention need not make reference to the content of 
the intentions of the ‘collaborators’ or any relevant participating others. All that the individual 
needs to know is that others are working in some way towards the same goal, or anyway 
acting in ways consistent with that goal being achieved.  It is not necessary that, say, the 
individual knows how the others are doing it (Searle, 2010, pp. 52-55)11.  
 
In my own account, it is worth noting, the reason that any individual can indeed take for 
granted, i.e., rely on, and come to believe that he or she can rely on, the actions of others is 
that all those involved are always acting as components of an organised emergent community, 
where the general function of the various organising collective practices is precisely to 
facilitate community coordination. Specifically, it is the notion of an emergent community 
that delimits the set of relevant others, along with a structure of obligations that allows beliefs 
to be formed that in certain circumstances others are acting consistently with an individual’s 
own goals. In particular, it grounds a belief that the effective cooperation of certain others in a 
particular activity can be taken for granted. Thus in the example of a symphony orchestra, the 
                                                          
11 Thus Searle observes, in a context where he is imagined to be engaged in a joint action with one other, “A crucial feature 
is worth repeating: The content of my singular intentionality [..] does not make essential reference to the content of your 
singular intentionality. I simply take it for granted, in that context, that if I do my part we will be trying to achieve that goal, 
because I am operating on the assumption that you will do your part, and you are operating on the assumption that I will do 
my part” (2010, p. 54). 
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various musicians are amongst its separate components bound together by appropriate 
facilitating rights and obligations and collective practices, etc. Being components of a 
particular totality means that the various individuals qua positioned musicians actively 
cooperate; that is the point of the community that is the orchestra. Here each musician can 
with reason take it for granted, indeed trust, that he or she is playing an instrument in a 
context where, because of the generalised acceptance of the organising obligations etc., others 
are also playing their instruments in an appropriate way. 
 
Whether or not an individual can strictly be said to cause her or his own performance, an issue 
on which Searle and I do both agree is that the action of the totality, here the performance of 
the symphony, is certainly not caused by the action of the components; rather it is constituted 
by their relationally organised activities. Thus focussing now on a duet Searle writes:  
 
“[Consider] the case in which we are performing a duet where I play the piano part and 
you play the violin part.  Here our playing does not cause the duet to be performed.  My 
playing and your playing simply constitute the performance of the duet. So from my point 
of view, I have a collective intention-in-action that we play the duet by way of me playing 
the piano, in a context where I take in for granted that you are playing the violin (Searle, 
2010, p. 52; italics in the original) 
 
I repeat that, at least according to my own conception, the reason Searle can take it for 
granted that the other person is playing the violin, the reason each person needs to know the 
substance only of what he or she alone is required to do, is that both are positioned as 
organised components of the social totality/community that is a musical ensemble where an 
appropriate form of cooperation is part of the positioned obligations, and each trusts the other 
to fulfil those obligations. 
 
It is this organised cooperation that Searle seeks to capture with his notion of collective 
intentionality12. Searle even uses the phrase ‘constitutive-by-way-of relation’. All that is 
missing, by my own thinking, is a recognition that any such relation is the property of a 
totality/community serving to combine various elements as the community’s (thereby 
coordinated and cooperating) components. 
 
 
 
Declaration and assignment of function 
 
Instead of viewing individuals as materially/practically positioned as components of a totality, 
however, Searle seemingly proposes a more mentalistic or representational approach. 
According to it individuals rather are merely ‘counted’ as in effect being appropriately 
positioned, with associated positional powers or functions.  
 
                                                          
12 Indeed Searle is insistent that in developing his notion of collective intentionality it is not enough that the individuals who 
are involved are doing similar things or a contributing to the same end; they have to be cooperating in their activities.  
Cooperation has several requirements in terms of belief, but the latter alone are not sufficient. Actually, Searle at one point 
suggests that nevertheless cooperation is not required in all forms of collective intentionality.  I am not so sure.  Searle points 
to cases where we collectively recognise a general practice and just go along with it, for example, using cash, speaking 
English, driving according to conventions of the highway-code. Because we just go along with it, suggests Searle, we are not 
appropriately described as cooperating as such.  Once though we see these collective practices as properties of communities, 
facilitating community coordination, then I think we must indeed interpret our participation as a form of cooperation.  When 
I stopped driving on the outside lane of the dual carriageway of the road leading into Cambridge I was precisely cooperating 
with all the others in managing the emergent pattern of traffic flow. 
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I say ‘in effect’ because positions, positional powers/functions, and positioning are not 
Searle’s language. Instead he advances a framework that instead employs the (apparently 
parallel) set of terms or expressions status, status function, and the assignment of function13. 
For Searle one of the most important applications of collective intentionality is precisely the 
collective assignment of function to people or objects. This is achieved by way of speech acts 
comprising, or taking the logical form of, Declarations.  These in their turn require or 
presuppose a language cable of facilitating the creation of status function declarations, and 
most especially constitutive rules.  Let me briefly elaborate.  
 
According to Searle, “humans have the capacity to impose functions on objects and people 
where the objects and the people cannot perform the functions solely in virtue of their 
physical structure” (2010, p. 7).  Rather the performance of the function “requires that there 
be a collectively recognized status that the person or object has, and it is only in virtue of that 
status that the person or object can perform the function in question”, as already noted. 
 
The required collective acceptance or recognition, an orientation that carries no necessary 
implication of approval, is a form of collective intentionality. For “the status functions to 
actually work, there must be collective acceptance or recognition of the object or person as 
having that status” (2010, p.6). 
 
Somewhat confusingly, perhaps, Searle suggests that it is these status functions (as opposed 
to statuses) that carry deontic powers, meaning that they “carry rights, duties, obligations, 
requirements, permissions, authorizations, entitlements, etc.” (2010, pp. 8-9). In any case, 
statuses and deontic powers are associated. 
 
How do these statuses and status functions come about?  According to Searle, they are 
created by speech acts of a type he calls Declarations, or at least those that take the same 
logical form. A Declaration is a form of speech act that serves to change reality to match the 
propositional content of the speech act, where, according to Searle, the reality in question is 
so changed just by representing it as being so. When, as an example, the British Queen 
declares that a new session of Parliament is open, or a judge declares that a court session is 
adjourned, then by those very acts of Declaration that which is declared becomes the case in 
fact. Similarly if someone declares ‘I promise that’ or ‘I apologise for…’ then in those very 
Declarations they are creating a promise and making an apology, etc. 
 
Searle believes this is how money, corporations and all aspects of what he terms institutional 
reality, with the exception of language itself, are in fact created: 
 
 “One of the primary theoretical points of this book is to make a very strong claim. With 
the important exception of language itself, all of institutional reality, and therefore, in a 
sense, all of human civilization, is created by speech acts that have the same logical form 
as Declarations” (Searle, 2010, pp. 12-13). 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
13 Though here and there Searle does slip into talk of positions.  For example at one point he writes: “But to declare war, 
adjourn the meeting, or divorce, you need something more than that [a competent speaker of the language]: you need to be in 
a special position where an extra-linguistic convention gives you the power to create the corresponding institutional fact” 
(Searle, 2010, pp. 111-12) 
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Institutional reality  
 
Before going further it is important to note that Searle here uses the expression institutional 
reality, and cognate categories like institution, and institutional facts, in a manner that is both 
somewhat idiosyncratic (certainly the terms are not used in the traditional manner of 
expressing a feature of social reality that is recognised to be relatively enduring – see Lawson 
2014a [2004]), and also reflecting of the evolution of his thinking. Let me briefly elaborate. 
 
According to Searle, a status is, or can be, created by Declaration.  Call the status Y.  Let X 
be anything to which it is ascribed in context C.  So by Declaration ‘X counts as Y in C’.  For 
example, a particular room counts as a study in my house.      
 
An institution for Searle is a set or system of constitutive rules having the form ‘X counts as 
Y in C’.  For example, such and such counts as a legal knight move in chess. Clearly Searle’s 
constitutive rules take the same logical form as a simple Declaration. Searle in fact interprets 
these as ‘standing declarations’.  By this he means Declarations for which there is no need of 
a separate act of acceptance or recognition (that each X counts as a Y) because the 
recognition is already implicit in the acceptance of the rule.  
 
Note that if we omit the “count as” phraseology and instead write such and such is a legal 
knight move in chess we are expressing a set of claims that Searle refers to as institutional 
facts. These sorts of facts, unlike other facts, termed ‘brute facts’ (the Moon takes an 
elliptical path around Earth; the average distance from Earth to the Moon is 384,400 km), are 
said to require institutions (sets of constitutive rules) in order to exist14. 
 
Even so, the question remains as to why any reality created by Declaration is referred to as 
institutional, when it is evident that not all of it, even in Searle’s reckoning, is constituted via 
standing declarations (sets of constitutive rules) specifically.  The answer is that when Searle 
originally worked out his theory he held the view that in all cases where status functions 
carrying deontic powers are assigned they are so via constitutive rules. Hence he designated 
all of this reality to be institutional.  Although in his later work Searle concludes that that 
there are other possibilities, and in particular that a simple Declaration can occur in the 
absence of any constitutive rules, Searle finds it convenient to persevere with his earlier 
terminology. Hence all reality that is said to be created by Declaration and involving deontic 
powers, and all facts thereby supported, are referred to as institutional. This usage thus 
expresses a reality not necessarily tied to constitutive rules. 
 
So to take stock, the two conceptions of social ontology, though sharing much in common, do 
manifest apparent differences. The Cambridge project emphasises emergent social entities, 
and especially communities and their properties, and most especially positions, collective 
practices and associated deontic powers; the project associated with Berkeley, emphasises 
collective intentionality, status function declarations, and institutional facts. 
                                                          
14 Searle thus writes: “Some facts exist independently of any human institution. I call these brute facts. But some facts 
require human institutions in order to exist at all. An example of a brute fact is the fact that the Earth is 93 million miles 
from the sun, and an example of an institutional fact is the fact that Barack Obama is President of the United States. 
Institutional facts are typically objective facts, but oddly enough, they are only facts by human agreement or acceptance. 
Such facts require institutions for their existence. Typically, institutional facts are facts that only exist within human 
institutions. And what exactly is a human institution? We have already seen an implicit answer to that, and I now want to 
make it explicit. An institution is a system of constitutive rules and such a system automatically creates the possibility of 
institutional facts. Thus the fact that Obama is President or the fact that I am a licensed driver or the fact that a chess match 
was won by a certain person and lost by a certain other person are all institutional facts because they exist within systems of 
constitutive rules” (2010, pp. 10-11). 
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Are these differences reconcilable? It is certainly the case that the former Cambridge 
conception allows for collective intentionality, a codification of collective practices as rules 
and supports the generation of institutional facts; and it seems to me that an account that 
emphasises collective intentionality, status functions institutions and institutional facts 
equally presupposes an account such as I have outlined in terms of emergent totalities 
including communities and collective practices.  
 
The latter, though, is not how Searle interprets matters. In particular, because he 1) interprets 
the linguistic element as somewhat more foundational for, certainly necessary to, the features 
of social reality that concern him, he in consequence 2) rejects all talk of social entities, or 
anyway social objects, presumably including thereby any notions of emergent social 
totalities, as at best unnecessary.  In fact, he regards any talk of social objects, where 
meaningful as derivative of talk of institutional facts. 
 
Let me, then, run through these two strands of Searle’s thinking and supportive 
argumentation.  I will indicate why I believe that the arguments made by Searle neither 
establish the necessity of linguistic representation of the sphere of reality that interests him, 
nor undermine the sort of social-entity, including community, based account I defend. Rather 
I believe the arguments made are suggestive of the inference that the two ontological 
conceptions being contrasted are ultimately not so different after all. I start with the question 
of the necessity of language to social deontology. 
   
The necessity of the linguistic? 
 
Why do I regard the linguistic aspect of social reality not to be foundational or necessary to 
all aspects of social reality that Searle designates institutional?  As I say, I believe there is a 
practical dimension; my concern is that this is underplayed, if not mostly neglected, by the 
focus on the linguistic. To get to the nub of the issue, Searle, if I understand him correctly, 
supposes that it is impossible to have deontic powers without a developed language, whereas 
I think such powers are implicit in the collective practice, which though presupposing of 
intentionality and forms of representation, ultimately does not require any kind of developed 
language.  
 
Let me be clear what I am not suggesting. It may well be that all of ‘institutional reality’ can 
be given a representation that has the same logical form as that which Searle terms a SF 
Declaration. I suspect too that (though remain open minded whether) any act that is 
undertaken intentionally to bring into being, or to shape, or to transform, a deontology may 
require language. Certainly, I believe that all forms of deontology depend on forms of 
representation.  My concern, though, is something else.  I take the view that deontology, and 
specifically any bound up with the collective practice, does not actually necessitate language; 
collective practices can emerge without it.  
 
Notice that the issue here is not merely whether an explicit declaration is involved. Searle is 
quite flexible in his treatment of the idea of a speech act. If, to return to an earlier example, a 
queue, say, forms in a given direction at a food station in a rock concert, and every newcomer 
to the queue conforms, then a collective practice will have emerged without any actual 
Declaration being made or even any speech act uttered. However, Searle appears to think of 
such practices as created by thought processes of the same linguistic type as Declarations just 
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because, or so Searle argues, it is in its being represented as existing that the queue exists. At 
least this is how I interpret Searle when he qualifies his position as follows:    
 
“Not all of them [institutional-reality-creating speech acts] are, strictly speaking, 
Declarations, because sometimes we just linguistically treat or describe, or refer to, or talk 
about, or even think about an object in a way that creates a reality by representing that 
reality as created. These representations have the same double direction of fit as 
Declarations, but they are not strictly speaking Declarations because there is no 
Declarational speech act” (2010, p. 13) 
 
In this case, as I say, I assume the speech act is merely a thought about the queue.  Still it is 
not obvious to me that in this case the collective practice in question is created by any speech 
act whatever the supposed logical form; rather the linguistic representation may arise after the 
event, if required.  All that is required it seems to me is a belief that a specific collective 
practice is in place. I am not sure that this in itself necessitates a fully developed language. 
 
For Searle, though, there is little doubt that it is speech acts of some form that create 
institutional reality; that “institutional reality, and therefore, in a sense, all of human 
civilisation, is created by speech acts that have the same logical form as Declarations” 
(Searle, 2010, pp. 12-13). 
 
So let me indicate why I associate a deontology with the collective practice, which though 
presupposing of intentionality and forms of representation, does not ultimately require any 
kind of developed language.  
 
There are two aspects to this latter assessment. The first is that the collective practice carries, 
in the sense of manifesting or presupposing, a deontology. The second is that the collective 
practice does not necessitate language. In fact, I would go further and suggest that the 
emergence of language likely required, as a precondition, the existence of deontology-
carrying collective practices.   
 
The reason that I believe that the collective practice carries a deontology is that its acceptance 
or recognition implies not merely a belief about how to do things but a belief about how 
things ought to be done (by anyone wanting to be participant in the relevant community). The 
collective practice thus possesses a characteristic that Searle describes as a two way direction 
of fit (of intentional states and actual collective practice to each other).  
 
The examples of driving and queuing already discussed do I think also support the notion that 
collective practices can and do emerge without language.  However, this observation is 
unlikely to convince an opponent of this view. For as noted I agree with Searle that, in all 
cases where a deontology arises, representations of some form are also involved; and it is 
always open to the opponent of my view to suggest that in a community with language all 
representations are linguistically mediated. 
 
So let me instead turn to the issue of whether collective practices that carry deontologies 
could have existed prior to language. Necessary conditions for this possibility, it seems to me, 
include intentional states such as desires and beliefs, collective intentionality, simple 
dispositions, along with an ability to cooperate, each of which Searle accepts as almost 
certainly being available to prelinguistic animals (e.g. 2010, p. 65, p.87). 
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If such conditions indeed prevailed, it is easy enough to imagine of early hominids that where  
experimental cooperative practices are discovered to be advantageous in some way they 
might be repeated by the discoverers and imitated by others, perhaps even to a point where 
dispositions so to act are established.  It is also easy to imagine how certain new sets of 
cooperative practices might link or fit with those already repeatedly followed, so that their 
success is linked to those already in place. It is equally easily imaginable that new arrivals on 
the scene including children come to believe that in the relevant context the practices in 
question are the done way, the natural or given way. In consequence, in seeking to fit in, to 
conform, to belong, they find reason to pursue goals in ways, or according to practices, they 
otherwise might not have been inclined to follow. In other words, it is imaginable how 
deontology could have emerged without language.  
 
Because shared practices are never universal it is also easy to see how along with the 
emergence of specific shared practices that are regarded as the done way of proceeding a sort 
of group identity or association would come into being. That is, it seems likely that 
communities and coordination-facilitating collective practices emerged together.  
 
For example, it is easy enough to imagine groups emerging around shared practices of 
obtaining and distributing food and water, of seeking protection from danger, of sheltering, of 
child care, disposal of the dead, and so on. With the development of such practices it is also 
easy to imagine the development of shared dispositions to treat collective practices as basic to 
community coordination, and so of believing that they are the proper or done ways of 
proceeding.  
 
However, it is not just the case that it is easy to imagine how collective practices could have 
emerged prior to language (an activity that is inevitably overly speculative), it is difficult to 
imagine how language could have come into being without the prior existence of collective 
practices. In particular, it is difficult to imagine both how language could emerge outside of a 
community, and also how the sort of coordination required for any kind of community life in 
general, as well as for the emergence of language in particular, could be feasible and survive 
without deontology-carrying collective practices of some sort.  
 
In particular, it is very likely the case that a necessary precondition for the emergence of any 
fully developed language is the prior practice of using simple symbols including sounds in 
communication.  These would have signalled basics like danger, or food, etc.  The point, 
though, is that in order that these function in the sense of communicating the intended 
meaning of the utterer, specific sounds would need regularly to be associated with the same 
referent (like ‘danger’), with an effective obligation accepted by those involved not to vary 
the association. But it is difficult to see how this sort of relatively complex form of 
cooperative practice of associating symbols with features of reality in a collective manner 
could develop outside of small communities already coordinated by, and familiar with, rather 
simpler forms of (emergent) collective practice. In other words, if to repeat, linguistic 
practices appear to presuppose the existence of non-linguistically based deontology-carrying 
collective practices that are always required for community/group members’ coordination. 
 
If Searle rejects this assessment, and he does suggest over and again that any deontology per 
se necessitates language, his challenge, I think, is to indicate how language could have 
emerged without the prior existence of deontology-carrying collective practices. In truth, 
though, I find his account to be reasonably compatible with that just set out.  
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Of course, given his emphasis on language as necessary to all institutional reality Searle has 
analytical problems or tasks specific to his own conception, and in particular that of showing 
that each Declaration itself, a form of institutional reality after all, does not require other 
Declarations, triggering an infinite regress. Searle of course is aware of this, and up to the 
challenge15. 
 
The question that I am pursuing, though, is a different one.  It is not specifically about how 
Declarations emerged without prior Declarations, but how any kind of language emerged. My 
question is in virtue of what does the sentence “Snow is white” mean that snow is white? 
Before any declaration is made, or linguistic operation can be performed to create some new 
institutional facts, how do we get to know the meaning of the statement “this piece of paper is 
cash”? 
 
The term that Searle uses that is closest to my own notion of collective practice is convention. 
And turning to Searle’s own account of the emergence of language one of the necessary 
conditions seems to be precisely a collective practice that Searle terms a ‘meaning 
convention’.  Let me say something about Searle’s account of language. 
 
For Searle one primary function of language is to communicate.  And a feature fundamental 
to this is meaning.  Searle distinguishes speaker meaning and conventional meaning. 
Speaker meaning has two aspects and two conditions of satisfaction. The first is an intention 
to produce an utterance, for example ‘it is raining’.  This is satisfied if the intended utterance 
is in fact made.  The second aspect is an intention to produce the utterance in conditions 
where the state of affairs the utterance is intended to represent are actually true; in this 
example in conditions in which it is actually raining. Alternatively put, the intention is to 
impose conditions of satisfaction on conditions of satisfaction. 
 
Conventional meaning, in contrast, is a collectively or “socially recognised device, some 
repeatable device, the production of which can regularly be intended by speakers to convey 
the message” (p. 75). It is a repeatable device that can be used to convey speaker meaning, 
the latter being a token of the former type. In my terms it is a linguistic collective practice. 
Searle writes: 
 
                                                          
15 As Searle observes: 
“[…] all of institutional reality is created by linguistic representation. You do not always need actual words of existing 
languages, but you need some sorts of symbolic representation in order for the institutional fact to exist. As I noted 
before, there is, however, an interesting and crucial class of exceptions: linguistic phenomena themselves. Thus, the 
existence of a Declaration is itself an institutional fact and thus a status function. But does it itself require a further 
Declaration in order to exist? It does not. Indeed, if it did, we would have an infinite regress.”  (2010, p. 14) 
So what is it about the Declaration that makes it a system of status functions that is exempt from the general requirement 
that all status functions are created by Status Function Declarations? Searle’s answer is that the utterance of a phrase like 
“snow is white” has one function. It counts as a statement that means that the snow is white. However an utterance of the 
phrase “this piece of paper is cash” has two functions.  Linguistically the utterance counts as a statement that just means that 
this piece of paper is cash. Non-linguistically, it counts as a declaration or a linguistic operation that constitutes this piece of 
paper as cash. In both cases, the semantic content is sufficient to render the utterance a statement. But the semantic content 
itself is not enough to make this piece of paper cash. 
As Searle puts it: 
“The meaning of the sentence “Snow is white” by itself is sufficient to guarantee that an appropriate utterance will 
constitute the making of a statement to the effect that snow is white. But the meaning of the sentence “Obama is 
President” by itself is in no way sufficient to guarantee that Obama is in fact President. In the case of the sentence, 
formulae of the form “X counts as Y in C” describe the constitution of meaning and not a separate linguistic operation 
that we perform. But, in the case of nonlinguistic institutional facts, constitutive rules of the form “X counts as Y in C” 
describe a linguistic operation that we perform by which we create new institutional facts, facts whose existence 
involves more than just the meaning of the sentences and utterances used to create them” (2010, pp. 14-15) 
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“With the introduction of repeatable devices that can be used to convey speaker meaning 
on a regular and repeatable basis, we have introduced the notion of a linguistic convention 
and with it the notion of a standing word or sentence meaning. The conventional device 
for conveying speaker meaning now has a permanent sentence of its own.  In describing 
this we have invoked the distinction between types and tokens” (2010, p. 75)  
 
Searle lists various other necessary prerequisites or components of language, but it is his 
linguistic convention that concerns me here. Once Searle has introduced and explained all the 
various components he writes as follows (where the italics are added by myself): 
 
“The animal has the intention both to impose conditions of satisfaction on conditions of 
satisfaction (and thus to create meaning) and to communicate those conditions of 
satisfaction (and thus, that meaning) to other animals. It does this according to 
conventional procedures. Those collectively accepted conventional procedures enable the 
hominids to create a type of commitment that is internal to the procedures but is not 
present without the collective procedures.  There is no way I can say to someone, 
publically, intentionally, explicitly, “There is an animal coming towards us”, without 
being publically committed to the truth of the proposition that there is an animal coming 
towards us, and that commitment is much stronger than the commitment to the 
corresponding belief by itself. […] I am committed to sincerity in making it, and I can be 
held publically responsible if it turns out to be false. 
So once we have an explicit language in which explicit speech acts can be performed 
according to the conventions of language, we already have a deontology” (2010, p. 82, 
italics added by TL) 
 
It is indeed the case that once we have a language we do already have a deontology.  But I am 
suggesting that we have a deontology even before we have a language as one of the latter’s 
preconditions. The excerpt from the foregoing passage that I have italicised does I believe get 
to the essence of it. Searle earlier in the text defines the notion of a commitment in terms both 
of ‘an undertaking that is hard to reverse and […] an obligation’ (pp. 81-2). In the italicised 
passage Searle allows that commitments - and so a deontology - can both require and be 
internal to conventional procedure, or to what I am calling collective practice. The emergence 
of language seemingly thus presupposes a familiarity with collective practices. Clearly, on 
pain of circularity, Searle’s notion of conventional procedure required for the communication 
of speaker meaning cannot be created by declaration involving speaker meaning.  
 
Consider too a passage that Searle uses in summarising his account of language.  After 
allowing that “We have to assume that they [early hominids] are capable of evolving 
procedures for representing states of affairs where the representations have speaker meaning” 
Searle writes of the procedures in question: 
 
“These procedures, or at least some of them, become conventionalized, become generally 
accepted.  What does that mean exactly?  It means that given collective intentionality, if 
anyone engages in one of these procedures, then other members of the group have a right 
to expect that the procedures are being followed correctly.  This, I take it, is the essential 
thing about conventions.  Conventions are arbitrary, but once there are settled they give 
the participants a right to specific expectations” (Searle, 2010, p. 87) 
 
This ‘right’ is a form of deontology and it is matched by the obligation of all other 
‘participants’ to follow the procedure, a collective practice, correctly. 
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Language, I am suggesting then, is in part built out of, and presupposes, the existence of the 
collective practice or ‘conventional procedure’. Although, of course, I have no idea how 
matters actually evolved it is easy enough to imagine a community having collective 
practices prior to language, but not vice versa. I do not of course deny that very complex 
contemporary forms of social or ‘institutional’ reality involve a deontology that requires 
language as a necessary condition. I am just arguing that this is not so for all features of 
social reality that carry a deontology, that this social reality has a practical dimension, that it 
is in part linguistic but not linguistically constituted. 
 
Searle’s refusal of all social objects or entities 
 
The feature identified at the outset above as appearing most manifestly to divide the two 
projects are differing commitments to notions of social entities or anyway to ‘social objects’.  
Whilst I believe social entities or ‘objects’ are an essential feature of social reality, Searle has 
little time for any such idea and supposes that, at best, notions of social objects are derivative 
of institutional facts. We will see that these differences reflect those concerning the more 
fundamental ones concerning the role of language already covered.  
 
To my knowledge the place where Searle expresses his views on ‘social objects’ and such 
like most systematically is in a published debate with Barry Smith (Searle, 2003; Smith, 
2003). So here I consider Searle’s stance in that discussion. The feature I do want to indicate 
is that Searle’s critique there does not undermine the conception of social entities qua 
emergent totalities defended here. Nor is a case for the priority of institutional facts 
established. 
 
So why and how does Searle resist talk of social entities or objects? Basically Searle’s 
argument, at least as formulated in his debate with Smith, is that talk of social objects is 
misleading and likely to confuse.  It implies that social objects form a separate class, along 
with kinds like water or iron, whereas Searle believes this cannot be the case. 
 
According to Searle’s conception, any object X can be interpreted as social only where, via a 
status function declaration, it comes to be counted as a social object (as a dollar bill or 
whatever).  So X is, or is not, social only according to how we look at (or count) it.  
Alternatively put, any such X can at one and the same time be both a non-social and a social 
object, with the implication that there can be no class of social objects that is distinct from the 
class of non-social objects.  Searle concludes from this line of reasoning that any notion of 
social objects is likely to mislead:     
 
“The notion of a social object seems to me at best misleading, because it suggests that 
there is a class of social objects as distinct from a class of non-social objects. But if you 
suppose that there are two classes of objects, social and non-social, you immediately get 
contradictions of the following sort: In my hand I hold an object. This one and the same 
object is both a piece of paper and a dollar bill. As a piece of paper it is a non-social 
object; as a dollar bill it is a social object. So which is it? The answer, of course, is that it 
is both. But to say that is to say that we do not have a separate class of objects that we can 
identify with the notion of social object. Rather, what we have to say is that something is a 
social object only under certain descriptions and not others, and then we are forced to ask 
the crucial question: What is it that these descriptions describe?” (2003, p. 302) 
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Clearly Searle and I do not mean quite the same thing by the attribute of being social.  For 
according to my conception any piece of paper is, even qua a bare piece of paper, a social 
object in that it has come into being through human interaction. 
 
Even so, I still need to show that there is a distinct set or class of social objects, or structures 
etc., i.e., that the open sentence ‘X is a social object’ is extensional with respect to 
substitutability.  But social objects, as I conceive them, do form a distinct class. An object X 
is social just if its existence does necessarily depend, in part at least, on human beings and 
their interactions. One and the same object X cannot both satisfy and not satisfy this criterion 
of the social.  
  
The point is that according to the conception I defend, a social object comes into being via a 
process of emergence (including modification), not though being merely counted as social (as 
say in being counted as a dollar bill, or a passport) but in being formed as a totality out of 
pre-existing factors. In this process of emergence, the elements that become positioned as 
components may (or may not) themselves be social.  But if not, and if they are not modified 
through the process of positioning, then the process of positioning per se (corresponding to 
Searle’s ‘counting as’) does not itself render these objects social, or indeed a different kind of 
thing to that which they already were. In the process of being positioned, some pre-existing 
capacities of each element do thereby become interpreted as that element’s set of system 
functions, and positional identities may be acquired. But there is no suggestion that any 
element so positioned itself becomes a new kind of stuff or whatever.  
 
Thus, suppose some wild (or non-humanly modified) plants are arranged as components of a 
garden. Although the emergent totality (the garden) and the organising structure (the 
arrangement of plants, etc.) are social in that in part they depend necessarily on human 
practice, the plants do not thereby become social objects.  
   
Or suppose I adapt Searle’s example so that in place of pieces of paper our ‘cash’ consists in 
natural occurring but relatively rare forms of sea shell and/or bits of rare metal. By creating 
an accounting system in which these non-social objects are positioned as components, i.e., as 
cash, the latter would not become thereby social objects.  However, the community as an 
emergent totality, structured in part by an accounting system in which these objects figure as 
components, would, qua totality, and along with its structure, definitely be social in nature; 
the community and its structure would constitute emergent features dependent necessarily on 
human interaction. But the shells and/or bits of metal remain non-social, albeit positioned and 
so serving as components of a social system. In so doing they do not change their nature and 
become a new kind of stuff, even if we can conceive of them as being attributed a novel 
social identity (expressing the novelty of their acquired positioning).  
 
By similar reasoning, it follows that Searle’s twenty dollar bill is neither both paper and not-
paper, nor both a twenty dollar bill and not a twenty dollar bill. Either the object in question 
is positioned as a twenty dollar bill or it is not.  It is never both.  And wherever or however it 
is positioned there is always but one object.   
 
So what precisely am I arguing? Let me summarise my position in the form of a response to a 
challenge issued by Searle. The challenge figures at the end of the following passage which 
summarises Searle’s preference for thinking in terms of institutional facts rather than social 
objects: 
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“In so far as we do have a coherent notion of social object, it is derived from the notion of 
social and institutional facts. Thus there is only one object which is both a piece of paper 
and a dollar bill, but the fact that it is a piece of paper is not the same fact that it is a dollar 
bill, even though they are both facts about one and the same object. A typical question 
from my analysis is: What is the relationship between the fact that this is a piece of paper 
and the fact that it is a dollar bill; how, so to speak, does humanity get from the facts about 
paper to the facts about dollar bills? I think you cannot ask or answer that question 
coherently if you start off with the idea that you are investigating the ontology of social 
objects” (Searle, 2003, pp. 302-3) 
 
My own assessment to the contrary is that we can ask and answer the question coherently, 
and possibly only answer it sufficiently, if we start off with the idea that we are investigating 
the ontology of social objects. But providing the answer does require that we recognise that 
the various objects that concern us come to comprise components of different social systems. 
The different facts are implicitly about their serving as components of different totalities.   
 
Searle mostly does not mention such systems but instead talks merely in terms of X counting 
as Y in C.  So we seem to have one object that is referred to as both as an X and as a Y, and 
nothing to separate them beyond our ‘counting as’ practices (in C).  But there is more. Or at 
least there is if my own conception is accepted. For an X becomes counted and so known as a 
Y only when it is materially/practically positioned as a component of a system. It is that 
material practical positioning that grounds or licenses the fact that X counts as Y in C. That is 
how we get from facts about paper to the facts about dollar bills, via the material and 
practical positioning of the paper as a component in the community accounting system. 
Certainly, there is no problem here in starting off with the idea that we are investigating the 
ontology of social objects.  
 
Moreover, it is often the case that any X we might consider is positioned as a component of 
various different systems simultaneously.  For example, the computer in front of me is 
positioned as a component in a music system, a mailing system, a publishing system, a time 
keeping system, and so on16.  In each system, a different capacity takes on the role of 
characteristic system function.  And I can meaningfully refer to the computer as a media 
player, a mailing device, and so on.  But there is nothing here that contradicts any 
requirement that there is but one object in front of me, or that contradicts any requirement 
that the object is not both a computer and not a computer, or both a component of a music 
system and not so, or whatever. 
 
So, in short, like Searle I accept that we can often generate numerous institutional facts about 
a given X.  But I am suggesting that these relate to different positions that the X occupies; 
they are not claims that X has become different kinds of stuff.  We can certainly attach to X 
various different positional identities, but still there is one object, that occupies many 
different positions.  So the different facts generated express different but very real aspects of 
a very real social scenario. I see nothing in any of this that threatens a naturalistic account, or 
that justifies our giving up on the notion of a social object, or at least of emergent social 
entities and their structures. More positively, I am arguing that it is these positionings of X as 
                                                          
16 Notice, too, though it is not an issue of relevance here, that just as the deontology associated with a position occupied by 
humans can be transformed (indeed individuals are often seeking to transform the powers to which they have access – see 
Lawson 2012, 2013a, 2013b, 2014b) so the functions associated with a give position occupied by objects can change. Thus 
where a computer is positioned as a component of a music system, the system function in question may be changed from 
providing music to listen to, to serving as a DJ tool, to serving as a means of sharing music/playlists with internet-connected 
friends, etc.   
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a component of various different social entities - a matter of ontology of social objects or 
entities - that explains how we can get, and are justified in getting, from facts about X to facts 
about Y. This insight I think renders the account I defend more explanatory powerful than 
Searle’s that seemingly cannot go beyond noting that different groups count various things 
differently 
 
Similar sorts of considerations apply to the positioning of people, of course.  Searle writes:  
  
 “Again, when I am alone in my room, that room contains at least the following "social 
objects": a citizen of the United States, an employee of the state of California, a licensed 
driver, and a taxpayer. So how many objects are in the room? There is exactly one: me.” 
(2003, p. 302) 
 
Yes and the one and same person is simultaneously positioned as components of different 
systems or communities. The latter are certainly social entities. But once more it is the 
different positionings, all real aspects of very real emergent social communities, that ground 
the generation of different facts about this single human being. 
 
I am maintaining, then, that there is more to social existence or institutional reality than 
linguistic declarations or whatever. There is a material or practical dimension to social reality 
that grounds the institutional facts that can be generated. Searle’s institutional facts 
essentially relate to features of the organising structures of social entities, and in particular 
positions and associated rights and obligations or social relations. 
 
We can certainly agree with Searle that the various features of social reality thereby picked 
out are not like tables and chairs or solid objects, and in that sense they appear unusual17.  But 
this insight does not, I think, compel us to reject their reality. Rather I maintain that in all 
these cases we are dealing with real aspects of a mind dependent, but not totally mind 
determined, social reality.  Social structure in particular is continually reproduced and 
transformed through our individual practices in total, however aware or unaware, and indeed 
mistaken, we may be in our conceptions of all that is going on. 
 
The point, in any case, is that Searle’s arguments do not undermine the account of social 
entities defended here. Indeed I would suggest that the latter grounds Searle’s conception. 
Certainly there is no obstacle to indicating how we can get from facts about X to those about 
Y by starting off with the idea that we are investigating the ontology of social objects. I am 
suggesting that institutional facts are facts not about isolated individuals but about individuals 
relationally organised as components of a totality, where that relational organisation of a 
totality is, like the latter, an emergent feature itself. As such, it seems to me, institutional facts 
are always derivative of things in the world. Certainly it is difficult to maintain that it is 
merely the other way round. 
 
                                                          
17 Searle writes: 
“Furthermore, many of the phenomena that are absolutely crucial to my analysis of institutional reality are not in any 
ordinary sense objects at all. Consider my obligation to pay money to you, which obligation I incurred when I made a 
promise to you last week. When I impose the status function on my utterance, one might, decide to construe the 
utterance as an object, at least in the sense that it was an event that occurred in space and time. But what kind of an 
object is an "obligation" that persists after the demise of its physical creation? And this is not an exceptional case on my 
account, because the ontology of institutional reality according to me amounts to sets of rights, obligations, duties, 
entitlements, honors, and deontic powers of various sorts. Smith thinks of all of these as "objects", but I believe that it is 
an obstacle to understanding their nature if you think of them as all objects in the sense in which chairs and tables are 
objects” (2003, p. 303) 
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Seeking to relatively evaluate the two conceptions 
 
I am suggesting then that on the points at which the two accounts seemingly diverge the 
emergentist account grounded in collective practice is the more explanatory powerful. Is 
there any way to discriminate further between the two conceptions by focussing on their 
contrasting implications?  Is it possible to find ways in which they generate different 
conclusions that can be examined for their adequacy? 
   
I think there may be. Being unconstrained by any notion that the formulation ‘X counts as Y 
in C’ is always grounded in practical matters of positioning objects as components of 
totalities, Searle has no reason to suppose even that his status functions, the Y terms, need 
actually always to be attached to some objects, the X terms.  In recent years, indeed, Searle 
has come to accept that there are very significant cases where no such X terms are required. 
Linguistic operations, it is held, can create ‘freestanding Y terms’; a situation can arise where 
there is a status function but nothing, no X term, on which the latter is imposed. 
 
From my own perspective in contrast, because institutional facts reflect a physical reality, 
there must be, and I believe there always is, an X grounding any institutional claim (that X 
counts as) Y. More specifically, there must always be an X actually or potentially positioned 
as a real component of a real emergent totality or system.  
 
I think Searle is mistaken on this issue, and precisely because the social ‘object’ ontology 
underpinning his institutional facts is left overly implicit. In any case we have here an issue 
that can, as I say, likely help us discriminate further between the two conceptions. Certainly, 
if there are indeed freestanding Y terms, this would seem to suggest that the account I defend 
cannot be quite right.  So it is to Searle’s arguments in favour of freestanding Y terms that I 
now turn. 
 
Freestanding Y terms 
 
According to Searle there are apparently cases where status functions, forms of deontic 
powers, are regularly assigned that serve a purpose without requiring an object or person on 
which or upon whom the status function is imposed: 
 
“Another interesting case arises when it turns out, in very sophisticated societies, that there 
are forms of the imposition of status functions, forms of deontic powers, that do not even 
require an object or person on whom the status function is imposed. Thus, what Barry 
Smith calls “freestanding Y terms” exist when a status function is created without there 
being an existing person or object who is created as the bearer of the status function” 
(2010, p. 20). 
 
Let me quickly acknowledge that in my own framework too there are cases where it might be 
said that a position exists unoccupied. But these are rare and usually temporary at best.  An 
example is where a position has but a single occupant at any given point in time, and the most 
recent incumbent dies or resigns or otherwise exits it, or a positioned artefact malfunctions 
and is removed, etc. But then, typically, the departing occupant is typically replaced as soon 
as is convenient, given the rules of positioning, or availability of alternatives, etc. 
 
Certainly, according to my own conception, there is no sense in creating positions with 
associated powers or functions if there is no need or intention in the community in question to 
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assign one or more (considered to be appropriate) occupants to the position.  The aim always 
is to position an individual or object in such a manner that they bear the relevant powers or 
have capacities interpreted as functions, and thereby serve as functioning components of 
some overall system. 
  
Of course Searle does recognise that any powers assigned need to be exercised, etc. But with 
Y positions thought to be unoccupied or Y terms said to be freestanding, he seeks to locate an 
agency of powers elsewhere. In so providing an account of where the agency lies I think that 
on occasion Searle too effectively presupposes the sort of social entity ontology I am 
defending, though if so it certainly remains unacknowledged. However, once or if such a 
conception is explicitly and systematically acknowledged, I believe that the case for 
supposing that any Y term might be freestanding collapses, as we shall see.   
 
Let me then turn to Searle’s argumentation. Searle mostly grounds his thesis by pointing to, 
and analysing, cases that he takes to be specific examples of freestanding Y terms. These are 
not trivial ones.  They include the corporation, money and blind chess:  
 
“The most obvious case of this is the creation of corporations. And indeed, the whole idea 
of the limited liability corporation is that there need not be any person or group of persons 
who is the corporation because those persons would have to accept the liability of the 
corporation if they were indeed identical with or constituted the corporation. But as they 
are not identical with the corporation, the corporation can exist, and continue to exist, even 
if it has no physical reality. Another case is the case of electronic money, where what 
exists are electronic representations of money; for example, magnetic traces on computer 
discs in banks. There need be no physical realization of the money in the form of currency 
or specie; all that exists physically is the magnetic traces on the computer disc. But these 
traces are representations of money, not money. Another obvious example is blindfold 
chess. The players have the powers of having the queen or the bishop or the rook, all of 
them deontic powers, but there is no physical object which is the queen or the bishop or 
the rook, only the representation of these in the standard chess notation.” 
 
Because Searle’s case centres on the identification and analyses of these examples, I will 
focus on them too.  My intention is to argue that none of the three supposed illustrations do, 
on close examination, render themselves amenable to being interpreted as examples of 
‘freestanding Y terms’. Let me then consider each in turn, along with Searle’s analysis of 
who or what supposedly wields the powers if there is no X that counts as the Y. I start with 
the corporation. 
 
The corporation 
 
Contra Searle, the corporation does, I suggest, have a physical reality, an X with the status of 
a Y, an occupant of the position Corporation.  The precise occupants of the position in 
question, I have elsewhere argued, are particular emergent communities (see e.g. Lawson 
2012, 2013a, 2015b, 2015c).  And these are very real and physical, including real human 
beings amongst their components. 
 
For a community to be constituted as a corporation, or indeed as any kind of firm, it must be 
positioned, that is registered, in an appropriate (i.e., legalistic) manner.  Specifically, in the 
UK anyway, a community has to be formally registered/positioned/accepted/assigned the 
status of sole trader, business partnership, limited company, or something similar, requiring, 
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if positioning is to be successfully achieved, that the members are organised according to 
certain fairly general legalistic structures.  But in the process the positioned object remains a 
community throughout.   
 
When, however, a community is positioned (incorporated) specifically as a (limited) 
company (as opposed to a sole trader or ordinary business enterprise), something somewhat 
unusual happens: the community as a whole (i.e., a non-human entity) is positioned as a legal 
person (actually as a juridical person, with Juridical Person being a position within that of 
Legal Person, and containing within itself the position Limited Company [or Corporation]) 
On all this see Lawson 2015b, 2015c). This means that in law the community qua firm in 
question is interpreted as having certain rights and obligations normally associated only with 
natural persons.  These rights/obligations include those of ownership, or suing and being sued 
etc. Of course the concept of ownership (if at all meaningful – again see Lawson 2015b, 
2015c) is itself a form of community position/status; owning is not a natural feature of human 
individuals any more than it is of communities as a whole.  None of this, however, implies 
that some Y term (the corporation) is freestanding; all that follows is that the relevant 
position (the Y term) is occupied not by individual human beings qua isolated or unorganised 
individuals but by various whole communities; and rights that come with the position are 
associated with the latter. 
 
Early examples of such legal persons were monasteries in ancient Rome.  Although food and 
other items were donated to and/or gathered by the monks themselves, the monks were not 
allowed individually to own anything. So it was decided that the monastery, the community 
as a whole so positioned, was the owner (see Lawson, 2015b). Of course the relational 
structure organising the monastery will have included rules determining the allocation of food 
and so forth.  Nothing though was freestanding. Just as the monastery qua community 
remained a real entity throughout so do other communities that become so incorporated.    
 
Why does Searle suppose otherwise in the context of the modern corporation? To argue as I 
do it is necessary, of course, to accept the idea that the community as an emergent social 
entity. Searle does not take this path and in consequence interprets things very differently. Let 
me consider his specific arguments. 
 
One reason Searle gives for treating the corporation as a freestanding Y term turns on an 
interpretation of limited liability.  In the passage noted earlier Searle seems to suggest that the 
idea of the limited liability means there “need not be any person or group of persons who is 
the corporation because those persons would have to accept the liability of the corporation if 
they were indeed identical with or constituted the corporation.”  But the latter does not 
express the meaning of the term. When a firm is incorporated as a company/corporation it 
issues shares. Limited liability merely means that if a company gets into financial problems 
or other forms of trouble, its shareholders are not under the obligation to meet all the costs; in 
short their liability is limited.  (Similarly if shareholders get into financial problems, the 
company cannot be expected to meet the cost over and above the shareholders holdings -- 
though this is known as asset partitioning).  There is nothing here that implies the corporation 
cannot be constituted as a group or better community of people without their accepting full 
liability. Moreover, there is once more nothing in any of this that warrants acceptance of the 
view that some Y term (or position) can be ‘freestanding’. Searle though, concludes 
otherwise because, or so it seems to me, he is reluctant to embrace the idea of a real social 
emergent in the form of a community. 
 
27 
 
A further reason Searle gives for suggesting that the corporation is appropriately interpreted 
as a freestanding Y term is that it is seemingly not created out of some pre-existing object. 
Specifically Searle writes: 
 
“Notice that in the case of the corporation there was no preexisting object that was turned 
into a corporation […] The law does not say that some pre-existing X becomes a 
corporation: rather it says that a corporation may be formed. It says that the performance 
of these written speech acts – ‘executing and filing articles of incorporation’ – counts as 
the creation of the corporation – ‘the corporate existence begins upon the filing of the 
articles and continues perpetually’…” (2010, p. 98)  
 
But the corporation is always formed out of something that pre-exists it. A community that 
comes to constitute (be positioned as) a corporation has to be legally registered (positioned). 
In order to be so registered it has to be assessed to be of an appropriate nature, including 
having an appropriate legal structure (see Lawson, 2015b). For this to be so the community 
must in effect already exist to be deemed appropriately enough structured to be legally 
registered. In fact very many communities that come to be incorporated are first registered as 
sole traders or ordinary business partnerships. Certainly this is so in the UK.  That is, a 
community that has already been positioned, i.e., legally registered as (or assigned the status 
function of), a sole trader or an ordinary business partnership can through the process of 
incorporation be further positioned as a juridical and so legal person. Where a firm acquires 
corporation status from the outset, this merely means the entity in question, an emergent 
community, is effectively undergoing a double positioning in one move (see Lawson, 2015b). 
In other words, in creating a corporation an entity X is formed, that is a community, that 
becomes positioned in due course as a corporation.  There is no freestanding Y term. 
 
One final observation that Searle puts forward in support of the view that the corporation is a 
freestanding Y term, is that the corporation is often described as fictitious in some way. Thus 
although at times Searle appears to slip into the practice of referring to the corporation as an 
entity, he also qualifies this practice when he (also) refers to it, seemingly drawing on others, 
as a merely ‘fictitious entity’. He further observes that limited liability companies are referred 
to as ‘fictitious persons’, suggesting that this is because they have no physical existence:  He 
thus writes: 
 
“[…] we need to specify not just that the function exists but that there is an entity Y, the 
corporation, that has the function, even though the entity is, as they say, a ‘fictitious’ 
entity.  The point is that in such cases there is no independently existing X.  There is just 
the creation of an entity that has the Y status function, so the noun ‘corporation,’ carries 
both the name of an entity and the existence of the status function” (2010, p. 100)   
 
“In the case of freestanding Y terms, there is no physical object or person to which the Y 
status function is assigned […] Limited liability companies have no physical existence 
(that is why they are called ‘fictitious persons’)” (2010, p. 115) 
 
Here Searle seems to make the (common) mistake of supposing that the frequent association 
of the term ‘fictitious’ with the corporation carries the meaning of an ontological fiction.  
Although there are many others, especially in economics and corporate governance, who also 
suppose this is how the terms fictitious and fiction are intended in the relevant context, such 
interpretations are based on misunderstanding. The terms in question are legal notions and in 
fact mean something entirely different.  Let me briefly elaborate.  
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In law and legal theory a ‘legal fiction’ is a term of art. It refers to an apparent claim about 
some situation that is in fact wilfully ‘made up’, assumed or created by the courts or some 
other regulatory body and treated as ‘fact’ in law, in order to enable a legal rule to be applied 
to the situation in question in a manner that was never intended when the rule in question was 
originally introduced18. Essentially it means some X is counted as legally some Y even 
though we all know that other than via legal declaration it is not a Y. Mostly, the term is used 
where the outcome is somewhat more specific in that some person or entity is allowed 
occupancy of a position in order to achieve access to a set of rights or obligations that were 
never intended for such a person or entity. Whatever the case, there is always an X. The 
whole point is to allow some X to be positioned/counted as a Y.  There is never a free 
standing Y-term 
 
For example, adoption is a process whereby a child is interpreted as legally a son or daughter 
of a particular set of adults in order to grant both child and adults access to the rights and 
obligations of biological children and parents. The creation of the positions Adopted Child 
and Adoptive Parent is known as a legal fiction. But the individuals occupying these 
positions are not fictions. 
 
A second example arises as a result of the fact that since an Act of Parliament of 1624 (with 
some modifications in an Act of 1707) MPs in the UK have been legally disallowed to resign 
from parliament, except in such cases as an MP accepts an office of profit under the crown. 
Resignations (which were once, but are no longer, considered undesirable) are in modern 
time effected after all, but via the creation of two legal fictions. Basically two offices of the 
crown are maintained -- the Crown Steward and Bailiff of the Three Chiltern Hundreds of 
Stoke, Desborough and Burnham, and the Crown Steward and Bailiff of the Manor of 
Northstead – which are only nominally remunerated, carry no duties, and reside in the formal 
gift of the Chancellor of the Exchequer, for which any MP wishing to resign applies and is 
positioned19. In neither case is an individual so positioned a fiction.  
 
In the case of the corporation the law grants that a particular entity be regarded as a legal 
person in order for it to access certain rights and obligations intended only for natural 
persons. The mechanism for this is the creation of the position (or status function) Legal 
Person, containing the nested positions of Natural Person and/or Juridical person, the latter 
further containing the position Corporation, with the incorporated community positioned in 
(or assigned the status function of) the latter.  The reason for this particular legal fiction is 
precisely to allow the community as a whole to have certain rights of individuals.  In all cases 
there is not a freestanding Y term.  Indeed, if to repeat, the whole point of a legal fiction in 
                                                          
18 Jeremy Bentham who opposed its widespread usage wrote of it that: “A fiction of law may be defined as a wilful 
falsehood, having for its object the stealing of legislative power, by and for hands which durst not, or could not, openly claim 
it; and, but for the delusion thus produced, could not exercise it” (quoted in C.K. Ogden, 1932, xviii). 
19 On occupying such a position the individual (who thereby resigns from parliament) usually holds the relevant office until 
it is again used to effect the resignation of an MP. The two positions noted above are used in this way alternately. When 
more than two MPs wish to resign at the same time, the resignations are interpreted as being not simultaneous but as spread 
throughout the day, each member holding one of the offices for a very short period, measured in hours or perhaps minutes. 
The device or procedure in question, an example of a legal fiction, was invented by John Pitt when he sought to vacate his 
seat of Wareham in order to stand for Dorchester.  In May 1750 Pitt wrote to the then Prime Minister Henry Pelham 
notifying him that he had been invited to stand for Dorchester, and asking for "a new mark of his Majesty's favour” in order 
to change his seat. Pelham wrote to William Pitt (the elder) indicating that he would intervene with King George II in 
support, and on 17 January 1751 Pitt was appointed to the position of Steward of the Chiltern Hundreds, and was 
subsequently elected unopposed as member for Dorchester. 
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every example is precisely to allow a specific material person, object or entity X to achieve 
powers that were otherwise not available to them. 
 
The use of the term fiction in this context is certainly misleading and so not especially 
helpful, and many are misled.  It does not mean that the subject is an ontological fiction; in 
fact its use denotes precisely the operation with which Searle is most concerned: to allow one 
thing to count as something else.  But I repeat the emphasis is on the ‘one thing’, a person or 
entity, that gets to count as something else; the point of it is to allocate a position occupancy 
or a status function to an actually exiting person or object etc. that requires it. There is 
always a material referent of the X term, and a corporation is not after all a ‘fictitious entity’, 
it is only a fiction if (inappropriately) considered to be (positioned as) a natural (rather than a 
legal, and in particular a juridical) person. 
 
A further unfortunate, or anyway additional misleading, use of terminology is that the 
position (status function) Juridical Person is also variously, if informally, known as Juristic or 
Artificial or Fictitious Person.  Use of the latter term is merely to indicate that although 
positioned as a Legal person the entity in question is not positioned as a natural person. There 
is no suggestion thereby that any entity positioned as a juridical person is not a real entity. 
The corporation is such a real entity, and specifically a community.  And although it is not 
(positioned as) a natural person it is positioned as a juridical and so legal person, allowing the 
community qua corporation access to various positional rights originally intended only for 
natural persons. In other words, in all such cases of positions created as ‘legal fictions’, there 
always is an occupant (bearer) involved; there are no systematically freestanding Y terms. 
 
Searle’s attribution of the Y deontology  
    
I mentioned earlier that in the belief that Y terms are freestanding, Searle must identify some 
agency to exercise the associated powers. Or as Searle puts it, if the Y term does not bottom 
out in an X term it must bottom out elsewhere.  His proposal runs as follows: 
 
“The freestanding Y terms do not bottom out in concrete objects, but they do bottom out in 
actual people who have the deontic powers in question. So there is no object or person 
which is the corporation, but there are the president, the board of directors, the 
stockholders, etc. and the deontic powers accrue to them. A corporation is just a 
placeholder for a set of actual power relationships among actual people. The same holds 
for electronic money and blindfold chess. The owner of the money and the possessor of 
the queen have the relevant powers” (2010, pp 21-2). 
 
But this suggestion that the deontic powers of the corporation accrue to individuals is not 
entirely correct.  When financial and other problems arise it can be held that no individual 
bears responsibility. This in part is how limited liability works. The corporation as a whole is 
found to be liable. Indeed, throughout out the history of the corporation this has been a source 
of criticism by its opponents, a feature that allows various harmful activities carried out 
through its members qua community components to go unpunished (see Lawson, 2015b, 
2015c).   
 
Notably, though, in seeking a solution to the problem of how the deontology associated with 
the corporation might be exercised, Searle accepts that individuals are positioned as directors, 
president, stockholders, etc., and that power relations connect them.  He just does not take the 
extra step and acknowledge that these relations serve to organise or bind the positioned 
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individuals in question as components of an emergent social system that is the corporation. 
However without this acknowledgement of a totality and its intended function (in this case 
the co-ordinated production of goods and services to be sold to others, in a way that is 
intended to be advantageous to [at least some of] the community members, with [at least 
some of] that advantage interpreted as ‘profits’) it is not clear why specifically positions like 
those of President, Director, Employee, etc., are formed (as opposed to very different ones)  
or why they interrelate in the manner they do. I do not disagree with Searle that “the whole 
point of the creation of institutional reality is to create and regulate power relationships 
between people” (Searle, 2010, p.106).  However, it is essential to recognise that, especially 
where a totality is created by design, the sort of totality it is (hospital, school, army, public 
demonstration, academic workshop) has a bearing on the sorts of positions and power 
relations that will be involved. 
 
Once, though, we take the extra and (I believe) essential step and acknowledge that the 
relations that Searle mentions serve to organise or bind the positioned individuals in question 
as components of an emergent social system that is the corporation we can reject the notion 
that there is any placeholder involved. The corporation qua community is no less a 
placeholder than is the University of California at Berkeley, or the Berkeley Social Ontology 
Group.  The corporation is an organised emergent totality.  And it is onto this community-qua 
firm, a very real, not a fictitious, entity, that the specific rights and obligations of 
incorporation are bestowed. 
 
Money 
 
I turn to Searle’s second suggested example of a freestanding Y term, namely money, or 
rather electronic money. Let me recall that Searle’s reasoning runs as follows: 
 
“Another case is the case of electronic money, where what exists are electronic 
representations of money; for example, magnetic traces on computer discs in banks. There 
need be no physical realization of the money in the form of currency or specie; all that 
exists physically is the magnetic traces on the computer disc. But these traces are 
representations of money, not money” (2010, p. 20; emphasis in the original) 
 
Elsewhere Searle writes: 
 
“[....] money can exist without any physical realisation.  The magnetic traces on computer 
disks in banks that record bank balances are not actual money, but they represent the 
amount of money you have in your account, which you are able to spend without incurring 
any indebtedness even though that money has no physical existence.” (2010, p. 115) 
 
My interpretation of passages such as these is that Searle is presupposing that the usual sorts 
objects that constitute (are counted as) money are the specific pieces of paper and bits of 
metal that are more immediately counted respectively as notes and coins.  These together 
count as money. They are what Searle refers to as physical realisations of money. 
 
Of course, being concerned with institutional facts, Searle does not provide an account of the 
nature of money itself. More generally he does not provide any account of what an X is 
counting as when it counts as a Y. Whether or not the Y term is thought to be freestanding, it 
must always be the case that Searle interprets the Y term as basically a placeholder.  Where, 
as is typical, there is an X that counts as Y then the various functions or powers are allocated 
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to a relevant X, of course, and the Y term treated as merely a name. Thus, in his earlier work, 
when Searle interpreted money essentially as notes and coins so that it did bottom out in 
pieces of paper and bits of metal, Searle still treated the word money as a placeholder: 
 
“The word ‘money’ acts as a placeholder for the linguistic articulation of all these 
practices [‘owning, or buying, selling, earning, paying for services, paying off debts, 
etc.’]. To believe that something is money, one does not actually need the word 
‘money’. It is sufficient that one believes that the entities in question are means of 
exchange, repositories of value, payment for debts, salaries for services rendered, etc. 
[…]” (1995, p. 53) 
 
I am not sure if Searle’s assessment that magnetic traces and electronic devices are not 
money is grounded in a belief that the latter do not fulfil the noted functions or in the fact that 
they do not take the hitherto more familiar form of notes and coins. If they do fulfil these 
functions Searle should surely count them as money.  Thus, I assume he is suggesting that 
they do not and are but representations of such objects as notes and coins, etc. that do 
supposedly fulfil the noted functions. Of course, if magnetic traces etc., do not fulfil the noted 
functions it is not clear why Searle should associate them with money at all. Whatever the 
interpretation, I believe that Searle’s basic assessment of the functions of money is not quite 
right, and that this follows once more from failing to acknowledge money as a real 
component of an equally real totality.  Let me briefly elaborate. 
 
The nature of money   
 
So what is money?  Of course there are varying conceptions and debates about this that I 
cannot cover here without providing a full length (contentious) treatise on money. The only 
reasonable way to avoid a long discussion on the intricacies of the topic is boldly and starkly 
to state what I take it money to be, in terms of a conception I have defended elsewhere 
(Lawson, 2012). 
 
A first point to make is that like the term ‘firm’, the term ‘money’ is a generic one with no 
legalistic or technical definition.  Although we can be clear on the meanings of terms like 
sole trader, limited company, bank notes and coins, cheques, debit cards, etc., terms like firm 
and money are general categories encompassing various specific kinds. 
 
So where do we start? If we wish the term to apply to features of all the geographically, 
historically and culturally differentiated communities that are typically described as having 
(had) money, then I suggest there is but one thing common to them all: an accounting system. 
Implicitly or explicitly the various communities have notions of exchange and/or reciprocity, 
and an intent and means of ensuring that the results of exchanges are maintained in some kind 
of balance. Even here there is a basic problem of terminology. Should we use money for the 
items of value that give rise to the need of an accounting system, or for the various devices 
introduced within all the various communities to facilitate any such system of accounting.  
 
For historical reasons I prefer the term ‘money’ to refer to the former and I shall use the term 
‘monetary devices’  or ‘money markers’ to designate the instruments of accounting. 
Admittedly Searle seems to use the term money for certain of these accounting devises, and 
specifically he seems to suppose real money takes the form of cash. These terminological 
differences should not get in the way of the argument though. For Searle’s claim is that in the 
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midst of all this are freestanding Y terms. My aim here is merely to demonstrate this is not 
the case.     
  
Particular examples of modern monetary devices (Searle’s ‘money’) are certainly notes and 
coins, or cash. These, as I say, are the devices Searle seems to have in mind as (items that 
count as) proper money. The central feature that I think Searle does not fully convey, 
however, and indeed is absent from most discussions of these devices, is that their primary or 
system function is, as with passports, identity cards, wedding rings, and documents of 
ownership, etc., to identify the holder of the device (here cash) as an occupant/holder of a 
particular community position/status with associated rights (associated with specific 
obligations of others positioned elsewhere). The rights and obligations in this instance take 
the form of credit-rights (internally related to the debt-obligations of the issuer of the cash). 
 
In other words, monetary devices like cash are essentially IOUs. They serve the system 
function of being a marker and/or record of relations of credit and debt20. Needless to say, a 
very significant difference between the sorts of IOUs that might circulate amongst friends (or 
people who know each other and are familiar with each other’s ‘credit worthiness’) and bank 
notes and such like, is that that the latter are state backed. Basically modern governments 
through central banks create a legal order whereby banks have the right to create IOU’s of a 
sort that the government will accept as legal tender.  This means they can be used by all 
members of the community as a device facilitating the use of bank debt for cancelling 
financial obligations entered into with third parties as well as (or especially) for the paying of 
taxes.  
 
In short, through government legislation rights and obligations regarding repayments of debts 
that hold between the holder and issuer of debt are transformed respectively into 1) rights of 
the creditor (the cash holder) to use that government debt to cancel personal debts occurred in 
acquiring goods or that accrue as a tax payer, and 2) obligations of the issuer, ultimately the 
state, to ensure that conditions are maintained that allow the government debt to serve the 
latter intended functions. 
 
Underpinning all this is a reality of bank and ultimately government debt. The issuer of the 
cash stands in a relation of debt to its holder. If an individual holder of this debt seeks to 
make a purchase of say a television in a shop, they enter in the first instance into a relation of 
debtor to the seller of the TV. However, because the purchaser holds government or bank 
                                                          
20 Consider a scenario in which I shop at my local grocers but forget my wallet and the owner of the shop, recognising me, 
and believing me to be both trustworthy and having access to an income - literally that I am creditworthy- allows me to take 
my ‘purchases’ on credit (this is an event that has actually happened on more than one occasion). I could sign a piece of 
paper, and so create an IOU, recording my debt; the IOU would serve both to identify myself as the debtor (the person with 
the obligation) by my signature (say), as well as the creditor (the person with the right to expect payment), namely the 
grocer, through possession of the IOU. I am taking for granted here that a monetary/accounting system is accepted 
throughout the community involving an accepted unit of account, in terms of which debts are conventionally recorded (as of 
course is the case in the early twenty-first century UK).  
If the baker next door to the grocer shares the same opinion of my trustworthiness and creditworthiness, the grocer could 
in principle use this credit with me to ‘purchase’ bread or whatever, transferring that credit (with me) to the baker to cancel 
the debt incurred by this purchase of bread, etc., and in addition pass on the IOU (perhaps endorsed by the grocer) to the 
baker so that the latter can be identified as the person now holding the credit. 
It is important to recognise that it is the credit relation that has value and can be used to cancel other debts. It exists 
whether or not an IOU is created. If an IOU is created then it acts merely as an identifier; it is not per se the credit-debt 
(right-obligation) relationship itself. If the grocer or baker were to misplace the IOU I could still seek to fulfil my obligations 
if I remembered them; indeed there is a good chance we would all remember the nature of the credit-debt or right-obligation 
relation involved (and if the grocer, baker and I knew each other very well it is conceivable that the credit relation could 
even be repeatedly transferred between the three of us, with or without written IOUs, as often effectively happens within 
some families or between some friends). 
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debt as identified by a monetary device such as cash, this bank debt (identified by the cash 
held) can be used immediately to cancel the debt incurred in buying the TV (through handing 
over the cash).     
 
But notes and coins are but one monetary accounting device amongst others. That is, they 
constitute merely one set of devices for keeping tabs on credits and debits in the economy. 
Electronic accounting and forms of electronic money are different ones. They, like cash, 
provide ways of identifying where specific credit-rights and debit-obligations lie. And they 
are as real and functional as any other monetary devices, i.e., they are as much accounting 
devices, as the cash. They (like cheques and credit cards, etc.,) merely work differently. 
 
The functions that Searle identifies as those of money are really those of government-backed 
bank debt in a capitalist economy. Assuming that the government via the central bank 
facilitates certain conditions, then this debt can be used as a store of value, means of 
exchange, and so on.  However, the precise monetary devices that are employed in the 
facilitation of any of these functions of debt (by tracking where the debt relations lie) will be 
a matter of choice depending on the available technology of the time. 
 
So I maintain that we do not have a freestanding Y term in the context of forms of monetary 
devices (Searle’s money) either. Clearly we may not always be using notes and coins to 
identify and keep track of the various credit-debt relations of the modern community. The 
various electronic accounting mechanisms are merely modern devices to the same end; they 
are positioned as modern forms of monetary devices or as some say modern ‘money’. 
Whatever we call them they are positioned material devices functioning to serve the 
community accounting tasks assigned to them. 
 
Searle cedes to the claim that the Y term is freestanding, it seems to me, only because he does 
not start from an accounting system as a whole conceived as a major aspect of the organising 
relational structure of a modern community.  Once though we do so start, and we recognise 
that money in the form of cash is essentially an accounting device, we can see that various 
accounting or monetary devices are feasible and indeed, under capitalism at least, are always 
in existence. We can also see that there is little ground to identify any as having priority, as 
being in some sense the real form of monetary device, or to consider others as mere 
representations. In all cases, material devices are required to keep track of debit-credit 
relations, for in all cases something recognisable is required to identify the holder of 
something that is far less so. In short, where there is money there will always be some sort of 
material accounting device. 
 
We can also appreciate that Searle’s suggested solution as to where the powers of electronic 
money ‘bottom out’ assuming the electronic money to be a freestanding Y term is erroneous 
as well as unnecessary. Searle’s examples of money are all forms of (what I am calling) 
monetary or accounting devices. And these in all their forms are essentially material artefacts. 
And artefacts never bottom out in people (who somehow acquire their ‘powers’).  Any 
positioning of an artefact or material object (in a system), or assigning of a status to it, serves 
to render one of its causal capacities its system function.  This is not about human positional 
powers.  The system functions of monetary devices are to facilitate accounting within the 
community. The various devices work in different ways. The function of cash in particular is 
to identify its holder as someone standing in a relation of credit with whoever issued the cash. 
The functions of other devices depend on design and context. But people do not take on these 
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functions themselves. In all cases a material object is positioned as a system component of an 
emergent entity that is a community.  
 
Blindfold chess 
 
The example of blindfolded chess seems the least convincing of Searle’s illustrations. Searle 
suggests that in blindfold chess we have only representations of queens, bishops and rooks in 
‘standard chess notation’.  But in the more traditional form of the game there is no intrinsic 
form of queen, bishop or rook, and so on. These are always but symbolic markers of a set of 
moves. These could in principle take the form of bits of paper with say WQ, WB, WR (with 
W for white, Q for Queen, etc.). The fact that in blindfold chess players maintain a mental 
model of the positions of the pieces, and that moves are communicated via a recognized chess 
notation, does not mean there is a freestanding Y term. There will still be mental symbols 
involved, with certain symbols positioned to function in ways that are isomorphic to the 
manner of functioning of those pieces which in more conventional chess we refer to as a 
white queen or black bishop, etc., along with indicators of the positions of each piece relative 
to that of all others. There are no freestanding Y terms; it is just that the X terms are symbols 
represented only in the mind.  
 
So once more we do not need Searle’s solution requiring that supposed deontological powers 
of the pieces bottom out in those of people.  In any case, the possessor of the queen in chess 
does not herself or himself (normally) acquire the function of serving to identify and/or track 
a chess character with an associated set of moves. He or she may, qua a chess player, have 
the rights and obligations to physically or mentally ‘make’ certain moves. But with some 
marker, material or mental, being the object that is actually or mentally manipulated, there is 
in any case no freestanding Y term requiring a human to serve as a surrogate X term. 
 
In all such illustrations, it is simply unwarranted to suggest that freestanding Y terms exist or 
are required. Once we examine the true nature of the suggested examples – the corporation, 
money and blind chess - we find in each case definite concrete objects expressed by Searle’s 
X terms. The point though is that in cases like the corporation and money these objects can 
only be accurately understood once an ontology of emergent social totalities and structures is 
accepted. Ultimately, then, the cases collected under the head of freestanding Y terms support 
an account that grounds Searle’s counting practices in the emergence of social totalities.  
 
Conclusion 
 
My purpose here has been to highlight apparent differences in two conceptions of social 
ontology, of how society is constituted, and to examine whether such contrasts are 
fundamentally incompatible. Because this is my goal, a form of contrast, I repeat that I have 
avoided the temptation (in a paper that in any case, given its aim, is inevitably on the long 
side) to refer to the myriad of contributions that have critically examined one or other of the 
competing conceptions in isolation. The one conception, that which I defend, focuses on 
emergent social entities, especially communities, and the ways and means by which 
community members, perhaps typically though sub-communities, come to position human 
individuals and objects in various ways and more generally generate collective practices. The 
other, advanced by Searle, focusses on the contribution of language, invoking the categories 
of collective intentionality, status function declarations, and institutions as sets of rules (or 
standing declarations), along with institutional facts. 
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Whether or not the differences between the two conceptions highlighted are more apparent 
than real the different emphases taken do lead to the drawing of different implications. 
Specifically Searle gives linguistic operations a far more central role than I do, and in 
consequence Searle avoids almost entirely any talk of the emergent social entities that are 
fundamental to my own account.   
 
Though seemingly quite significant I am not convinced, however, that the noted apparent 
basic differences or orientations are irreconcilable. Certainly, in emphasising the reality of 
emergent social totalities and their relational structures I do not at all oppose a need for a 
naturalistic account or wish to deny a constitutional role of language, dispense with the 
descriptions that Searle calls institutional facts, or notions of collective intentionality, etc. But 
I have argued that it is the former emergent features that ground institutional facts and render 
them correct or not, albeit constituting a reality that depends on us and our attitudes and 
beliefs but which does not reduce to them. Searle may be reluctant to accept this assessment, 
but even if it is correct I do not think it undermines Searle’s conception so much as provides, 
as I say, a practical grounding for it. So at the end of it all I remain impressed primarily not by 
differences in the two contrasted conceptions of ontology, whatever their true extent, but by 
how much they appear, at some level or other, to hold in common. 
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